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God In The Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine
Matthew Sag*

Introduction
Yes, yes, our program just insinuated that George Pataki had a big, gay
experience on the Staten Island Ferry. This is the beauty of fair use.1
Fair use plays a vital but misunderstood role in copyright law. The central
dilemma for fair use jurisprudence is thatwithout the flexibility of fair use , copyright
would become unwieldy and oppressive; but if fair use allows too much freedom from
copyright, it risks undermining the incentives that the creators of copyrighted works rely
on. Typically, scholars express concern about one or the other half of this problem as
determined by their policy preferences. This article puts aside outcome driven analysis
and examines the larger role fair use serves within copyright law. It identifies two
structural purposes embodied by fair use, one determining the shifting balance of
copyright law, the other determining policy making authority over copyright law. First,
fair use bounds copyright rights, and in doing so it enables expansive definition of those
rights within those bounds. Second, fair use has allowed Congress to delegate to the
courts the difficult policy decisions as to the details of copyright owners’ rights.
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Many scholars have warned, with increasing urgency, that we are approaching the
“tyranny of copyright.”2 This dark vision of a “permission culture” argues that our
“creative ecosystem” is under threat because of certain legal and technological changes
that have increased the rights of copyright owners.3 The potential tyranny of copyright
stems from the combination of (1) our reliance on access to and use of existing works and
(2) the increasingly pervasive “ownership” claimed with respect to those works.
Consumers and creators rely on access to existing works, not just in artistic fields but in
countless areas of social, political, cultural and economic activity. Most of the fabric of
our cultural and intellectual lives is owned in some fashion by someone else.4
These concerns are not without foundation, but they are overstatedbecause one
person’s claim of ownership with respect to a work says very little about what others can
in fact do with that work, significantly, copyright ownership claims are contingent upon
the application of fair use. Reliance on owned works does not necessarily preordain a life
of intellectual servitude. The alleged tyranny of copyright is mitigated in part because
copyright claims are limited by fair use. In the landmark Sony decision, the Supreme

2

Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y Times, January 25, 2004. See also, LAWRENCE

LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND
CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
3

Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2, at 130.

4

Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 2003, at A16. (“The copyright system, though

constitutional, is broken. It effectively and perpetually protects nearly all material that anyone would want
to cite or use. That’s not what the framers envisioned, and it’s not in the public interest.”)
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Court held that home video taping of broadcast television programs was not an
infringement of copyright.5 Ownership of the copyright in the subject broadcasts was
undisputed; what was disputed were the implications of that ownership. By a five to four
majority the Court held that time-shifting by consumers was fair use and thus not
copyright infringement.6 The majority reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that
consumers were copying entire programs without the permission of the copyright owners.
The majority also held that Sony, the maker of the VCR, was not liable for contributory
infringement because time-shifting constituted a substantial noninfringing usefor the
product.7 Copyright ownership did not make copying by end users unlawful, and it did
not make the VCR an unlawful device.
Sony has become the poster-child decision for both consumers who believe they
have a right to copy and for businesses that provide tools or services related to consumer
copying. However, recent attempts by internet music pioneers Napster and MP3.com to
extend Sony into the internet age both failed.8 These cases, and many others, highlight the
uncertainty of fair use, especially in the context of new technology. Under the current
state of the law, consumers, entrepreneurs, academics, journalists and copyright owners
often cannot know with certainty what will, and what will not, be deemed fair use
without all the joy and expense of federal litigation.

5

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir, 2001); UMG Recordings v. MP3.Com Inc.,

92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (2000).
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The uncertain scope of fair use undermines its ability to effectively guard the
public interest in legitimate access to, and use of, copyrighted works. For example,
without fair use, some documentaries would never be produced.9 Even with the fair use
doctrine, the chilling effect of potential litigation may discourage many who could
otherwise rely on the doctrine.
Recognition of the structural role of fair use has the potential to mitigate some of
the uncertainty of current fair use jurisprudence. The statutory framework for fair use
both mitigates and causes uncertainty. It mitigates uncertainty by providing a consistent
framework of analysis – the four statutory factors. However, when judges apply the
statutory factors without articulating or justifying their own assumptions, they increase
uncertainty. The statutory factors mean nothing without certain a priori assumptions as to
the scope of the copyright owner’s rights; a more stable and predictable fair use
jurisprudence would begin to emerge if those assumptions were made more transparently
and coherently. This is the focus of Part I.
Part II describes the changes in copyright law brought about by the Copyright Act
of 1976. Copyright skeptics regard the 1976 Act as an unwarranted expansion of
copyright rights, constituting a triumph of special interest politics over the public good
and common sense. Part II argues that, whatever the politics might have been, the shift to
a dynamic system of copyright rights was a justified response to the combined problems
of legislative gridlock and the expectation of continued technological and social change.
9

Robert Greenwald’s Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War (2004), and Outfoxed: Rupert

Murdoch's War on Journalism (2004) both rely on fair use. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyrighting The
President, Wired, 12.08, August 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.08/view.html?pg=5.
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Part III, the heart of this article, examines the structural role of fair use in the
context of an evolving copyright system. Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of
expansive copyright rights are bound to be disappointed. Rather, fair use is a structural
tool that allows copyright to adapt to changing circumstances. This article establishes this
argument in two stages. First, recognition that the structural role of fair use is to enable
broader more flexible rights to be vested in the copyright owner. Second, it shows that in
order to preserve copyright’s ability to adapt to new technology, fair use must remain a
somewhat open-ended standard developed by the judiciary through the imperfect process
of common law adjudication.
Ultimately, the assumptions as to the proper scope of the copyright owner’s rights
can only be developed by deriving fundamental principles from copyright law itself.
Exactly what those fundamental principles might be is obviously a matter of debate; but it
is much narrower debate than that which is required by reference to normative
conceptions of the good in general; and it is much more likely to result in stability and
predictability in fair use jurisprudence than any of the cost- benefit approaches advocated
in the literature. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on transformativeness in its most recent
fair use decision, Campbell v. Acuff Rose,10 is an important step toward a more coherent
fair use doctrine; however, there are additional steps to be taken and other fundamental
principles within copyright law beyond its preference for transformative uses. This
recommendation is the subject of Part IV.
There are three principles of copyright law beyond transformativeness that judges
can use apply to give substance to the structural role of fair use. The first is the well

10

510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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established principle of the idea expression distinction. Recent case law suggests two
other principles are emerging, but have yet to be articulated. These are the principles of
consumer autonomy and medium neutrality. This article identifies these trends and their
potential to provide a more principled and consistent basis for fair use analysis.
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Part I – The Limits of Statutory Guidance on Fair Use
The difficulty of adjudicating fair use cases is well established. Almost every
comment on the subject notes that fair use is “one of the most troublesome [doctrines] in
the whole law of copyright.”11 One of the central difficulties of fair use jurisprudence is
the indeterminacy of the statutory factors. The statutory codification of the fair use
doctrine requires courts to consider four factors in determining whether a use is fair: (1)
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.12
The statutory factors provide a useful framework for analysis, but their limitations
must be explicitly recognized. The core limitation of the factors is that in order to
determine their application one must make an a priori assumption as to the scope of the
rights of the copyright owner. The challenge for fair use jurisprudence is to find a rational
and consistent basis for those assumptions – the first step in that process is to admit that
assumptions are being made. The current practice of most courts, treating the factors as
outcome-determinative, as opposed to question-framing, masksa priori assumptions and
distorts judicial reasoning.
Some commentators question whether the factors are relevant at all. David
Nimmer’s study of the relevance of the four factors concludes that they are not outcomedeterminative, either individually or collectively.13 Nimmer surveyed the application of
11

Dellar v Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).

12

17 U.S.C. 107.

13

David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” And Other Fairytales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

263, 280 (2003).
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each of the four factors in 60 fair use cases decided between 1994 and 2003.14 According
to Nimmer’s (admittedly subjective) assessment, the factors corresponded with the
ultimate finding only 55% , 42%, 57% and 50% of cases respectively.15 Even in the few
cases in which all four factors appeared to line up in the same direction, either fair or
unfair, they still had no predictive value.16 From Nimmer’s perspective, the four factors
uniformly pointed to one conclusion in eleven of the sixty cases, however, that clean
sweep only corresponded with the actual result in six of those cases; i.e. in 54% of cases.
Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair
use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the
same.17
Nimmer’s findings must be treated with some caution because litigated cases may
not tell us anything about the broader universe of fair use disputes.18 Nonetheless,
Nimmer’s findings provide rudimentary support for this article’s contention that the four
statutory factors are largely incapable of determining the outcome of fair use cases in any
objective sense. The next four subsections briefly review the statutory factors to
demonstrate that they are not outcome-determinative and that significant assumptions
must be made before the factors can be applied.
A.

Purpose and Character of the Use

The first factor as to whether a use a work is a fair use is “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
14

Id. at 268.

15

Id. at 280.

16

Id. 282 – 284.

17

Id. at 280.

18

See Priest & Klein, The Selection Of Disputes For Litigation, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1984).
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nonprofit educational purposes.”19 The law in with respect to this factor has weaved a
curious path. Commercial uses have been held fair,20 educational uses have not.21 The
Supreme Court’s comment that there are no bright line rules for applying the fair use
doctrine,22 appears, if anything, to be an understatement.
In 1984, the Supreme Court majority Sony declared that “every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation”23 In 1994, the Court was
asked to adjudicate the fairness of 2 Live Crew’s indisputably commercial parody of an
old Roy Orbison song in Campbell. In that case, the Court held that there was no
presumption that commercial use was unfair. As the Court observed,
[any such presumption] would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in
the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism,
teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities … which are generally
conducted for profit.24
The Campbell decision also marked another more subtle departure from Sony
concerning the purpose and character of the use. In Sony, the majority categorically
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the absence of a productive use precluded the
application of fair use.25 “Productive use” in this context means that the use leads to the
19

17 U.S.C. 107(1).

20

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994).

21

Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (unauthorized

reproduction of copyrighted works in university course packs not fair use); Princeton Univ. Press v.
Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
22

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).

23

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).

24

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).

25

Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971-972 (9th Cir., 1981).

9

Working Paper, March 2005 Draft

creation of a new work which results “in some added benefit to the public beyond that
produced by the first author’s work.”26 According to the Ninth Circuit decision,
convenience, entertainment and increased access were not purposes within the general
scope of fair use.27 In Sony, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the
productive/unproductive distinction could never be determinative of fair use.28
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Campbellsubstantially reintroduced the
productivity requirement under another name – the key question now being whether the
allegedly infringing use is “transformative.” Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the
Court, explained that the central purpose of the fair use investigation was to determine:
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original … or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether
and to what extent the new work is transformative.29
For Justice Souter, transformative works “lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”30 Accordingly, while
unproductive or untransformative uses are not to be presumptively denied fair use
protection, the heart of the doctrine is reserved for “transformative” uses. The dominance

26

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984). (Blackmun dissent)

27

Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir., 1981).

28

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984).

29

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). (internal quotes and citations omitted). See

also, Pierre Leval, Towards A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
30

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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of the transformativeness test makes the actual statutory language regarding noncommercial and educational uses largely irrelevant.31
Also, the extent to which a use is “transformative” is clearly a meta-factor: the
extent to which a use transforms the work cannot be determined without reference to the
other factors, such as the nature of the original work, the quantitative and qualitative
similarity between the works and the effect of the use on the value of the original work.
The merits and limitations of transformativeness are discussed in Part IV below. The
purpose of the defendant’s use is still important, it is just as clearly a subjective
determination. Bright-line distinctions, such as commercial/non-commercial and
educational/non-educational, have been superceded by a much more ambiguous notion,
transformativeness.
B.

Nature Of The Copyrighted Work

The second factor considered by the courts in applying the fair use standard is
“the nature of the copyrighted work.”32 Two aspects of the nature of the work are
important to consider: whether the work is factual as opposed to creative; and whether the
work is published or unpublished.
In principle, the more creative the original work is, the more justification is
required to establish a fair use in relation to it.33 Anecdotally, this aspect of the nature of

31

Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th Cir. 1996) (Circuit Judge

Merritt, dissenting).
32

17 U.S.C. 107(2).

33

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
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the work tends not to ber egarded as significant.34 The Supreme Court did not consider
the creative nature of television programs or musical compositions to be an obstacle to a
finding of fair use in Sony or Campbell. At the other end of the spectrum, the Second
Circuit has held that the copying of one factual work by a rival was not protected by fair
use.35 The second factor is especially unhelpful in cases involving parody, because
parody is predicated on the existence of an antecedent creative work. As the Supreme
Court noted in Campbell, in the context of parody, the second factor “is not much help ...
in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats.”36
After the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Harper & Row v. Nation
Enterprises,37 it briefly appeared that use of an unpublished work could almost never
qualify as fair use.38 The Nation had published a 300 to 400-word extract of the soon-tobe published memoirs of President Gerald Ford dealing with the Nixon pardon,
preempting an article that was scheduled to appear in Time magazine. Time had agreed to
purchase the exclusive right to print pre-publication excerpts of President Ford’s memoir;
but as a result of the defendant’s article, Time canceled its agreement. The majority held
that “[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”39

34

According to Nimmer’s analysis, it actually has a negative correlation with the outcome. Nimmer,

Fairest Of Them All, supra note 13, at 280.
35

Financial Information, Inc v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).

36

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).

37

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).

38

Id. at 555.

39

Id. at 555.
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Two cases from the Second Circuit followed and enlarged this ruling. In Salinger
v Random House, 40 the Second Circuit held that a literary biographer of reclusive author
J.D. Salinger was not permitted to quote from a selection of Salinger’s unpublished
letters and drafts. In New Era v Holt,41 the same court held that the quotation of
unpublished material to establish a variety of critical assertions with respect to L. Ron
Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, was equally unavailing on fair use grounds.42 In
both cases the court held that unpublished works normally enjoy “complete protection
against copying any protected expression.”43
In 1992 Congress revised Section 107 and made it clear that “[t]he fact that a
work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.”44 In light of Congress’ clarification of Section
107, the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row is easier to reconcile as deriving
from the fact that the work in question was soon-to-be published, not that it was
unpublished.45 In any event, the nature of the copyrighted work remains unhelpful in
assessing whether an activity is protected by fair use or not.
40

Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir., 1987).

41

New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).

42

Id.

43

Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir., 1987); New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co.,

873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989). See also, Leval, supra note 29, at 1113.
44

Amended 10/24/92 by Pub. L. No. 102-492.

45

Leval, supra note 29, at 1120. Note that Judge Leval authored both the Salinger and New Era opinions

overturned by the Second Circuit. Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev’d &
rem’d 811 F.2d 90, (2d Cir. 1987) and New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695
F. Supp. 1493 (D.N.Y., 1988) aff’d on other grounds 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
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C.

Amount And Substantiality Of The Portion Used

The third factor to be considered in adjudicating fair use is “the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”46 The
need for both a quantitative and a qualitative inquiry harks back to Justice Story’s
original formulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh.47 In that case, Justice
Story was concerned to protect the “chief value of the original work” against the
extraction of its “essential parts” through the mere “facile use of scissors” or its
intellectual equivalent.48 In theory, the greater the portion of a work that is copied, the
less inclined a court will be to find in favor of fair use. In practice, several cases
confound this basic proposition, relying instead on subjective qualitative impressions or
suppositions as to the value of the work.
In Harper & Row, the defendant copied a mere 300 words from a 200,000-word
manuscript, and yet the Supreme Court held that this constituted a substantial taking
under the third factor.49 This extraordinary conclusion only makes sense in context of the
Court’s manifest disapproval of the conduct of the defendant, particularly the manner in
which it obtained access to an advance copy of the biography and its scoop of the Time
magazine story. In Sony, the majority of the Supreme Court found that home videotaping
entire programs for later viewing was fair use.50 In Campbell, the Supreme Court held
46

17 U.S.C. 107 (3).

47

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

48

Id. at 345.

49

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). The words were not

even entirely sequential, see EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 155 (2000).
50

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
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that even though rap musicians 2 Live Crew had copied the heart of the original Roy
Orbison song – the first line of lyrics and characteristic opening bass riff – nonetheless,
the defendant’s appropriation could be protected by fair use.51 The Court reasoned that
copying the heart of the song was excusable because it is the heart which most readily
conjures up the song for parody, and also because it is the heart at which parody
generally takes aim.52
The point to be understood is not that the amount of the work used is never
significant; but rather that while the third factor provides a convenient platform for
bolstering existing conclusions, it provides little ex ante guidance. The question of
qualitative significance is inextricably tied with the fourth factor because each requires
the court to assess the “value” of the original work. The third factor does not rely on
mechanical quantification of the amount of the original work used, it asks courts to asses
how much of the value of the original work is present in the later use. Similarly, the
fourth factor asks what the effect of the later use is on the value of the original work.
Thus both the third and forth factors require the determination of the antecedent question
– the value of the work. In each case, the value of the original can only be determined
with reference to scope of the copyright owner’s rights of exclusion; treating the statutory
factors as outcome-determinative, as opposed to question-framing, ask us to believe the
opposite is true.

51

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).

52

Id.
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D.

Market Effect

The fourth statutory factor in fair use analysis is “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”53 In short, the fourth factor asks
“what is the market effect of the unauthorized use?” It is worth exploring this factor in
some detail, first because it is sometimes said to be the most important factor, 54 and
second because questions of market effect dominate academic literature. Assessing the
market effect of an unauthorized use confronts judges with a potential circularity: while
their ultimate ruling defines the scope of the market, they are supposed to examine the
market effect in making that ruling. In other words, they must make a ruling based on a
finding that is contingent on their ruling. This theoretical circularity is mitigated by the
reality that judges begin with a view as to the proper scope of the copyright owner’s
rights and then apply the statutory factors in a manner that transforms those priors into
conclusions.
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that analysis of market effect must include the
effect on the copyright owner’s continued exploitation of existing markets and her
potential exploitation of markets she is yet to enter.55 If unexploited markets were left to

53

17 U.S.C. 107(4).

54

The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on fair use warns that the statutory factors are not to be

treated in isolation, rather “[a]ll are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). But see, Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (fourth factor undoubtedly single most
important element of fair use);and Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (factors not created equal, fourth factor at least primus inter pares).
55

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 593-594 (1994).
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fair users by default, copyright owners would find themselves in a race to exploit their
works in as many markets as possible to preserve their future rights. The author of a
novel would rush to make some token exploitation in every context imaginable; from the
plausible (sequels, screen-plays, and television series) to the unlikely (soft toys, action
figures, and private-label credit cards).
Although considering potential and derivative markets is clearly necessary, it
raises the problem that copyright owners can claim that almost any new use of their work
is part of an unexplored derivative market. For example, although it had shown no
interest in licensing a derivative of “Pretty Woman” in the rap genre before its lawsuit
against 2 Live Crew, Acuff Rose (Roy Orbison’s publisher) argued that 2 Live Crew’s
parody diminished its potential to do so. The Supreme Court lent credence to these kinds
of argument by remanding the case in Campbell to the district court to determine whether
the 2 Live Crew parody had dampened the potential demand for non-parody derivatives
of the original song in the rap genre, a market hitherto unexplored by the copyright
owner.56
The uncertainty of the original work’s potential market necessitates defining the
limits of that market in order to ascertain whether the allegedly infringing use has any
effect on it. This encourages a kind of circular reasoning: findings of fair use are
premised on narrow market definitions; while denials of fair use are premised on
expansive market definitions. The reasoning is circular because although the fair use

56

Id. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to hear evidence as to the likely effect on the

market for a non-parody, rap version of original song. It is puzzling to consider what evidence the Court
thought would be produced, see 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05.
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question determines the extent of the market, the extent of the market also determines the
outcome of the fair use question.
Two cases concerning photocopying illustrate the potential circularity of
examining the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. In
both Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,57 and American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco,58 academic journal publishers alleged that their copyrights were infringed by
defendants making unauthorized photocopies of journal articles for medical and scientific
research. The two cases, decided almost 20 years apart, are barely distinguishable on their
core facts, and yet reach entirely opposite conclusions.
The difference between the cases lies in the latter court’s willingness to find that
the publisher suffered an adverse market effect. The Court of Claims in Williams &
Wilkins held that the evidence on the record failed to show that the defendant’s
photocopying practices caused a significant detriment to the plaintiff. In American
Geophysical, the Second Circuit also concluded that, based on potential sales of
additional journal subscriptions, back issues, and back volumes alone, the evidence of an
adverse market effect was weak.59 However, the majority of the Second Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff prevailed on the fourth factor because of the availability of
licensing facilitated through the Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”).60 The majority
found that through this collection organization, the publishers had created “a workable
57

Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74 (Ct. Cl., 1973) aff’d by equally divided Court,

420 U.S. 376 (1975).
58

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir., 1994).

59

Id. at 928.

60

Id. at 929.
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market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies
of individual articles via photocopying.”61 In the opinion of the majority, the potential
licensing revenues that would be forgone by publishers if a finding of fair use was made
itself constituted an adverse market effect under the fourth factor.
Any copyright owner who loses an infringement action because of a finding of
fair use has also lost at least one potential licensee, although in some cases the prospects
of a license are more theoretical than real.62 The majority in American Geophysical
argued its reliance on potential licensing revenues was not circular because:
[o]nly an impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed markets should be legally cognizable when evaluating a
secondary use's effect upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.63
However, the addition of the “traditional, reasonable, or likely” requirement does not
entirely mitigate the problem of circular reasoning. Determining whether a market is
“traditional, reasonable, or likely” is indistinguishable from determining the scope of the
copyright holder’s rights: both require courts to make an a priori assumption and then
compare that assumption to the conduct of the defendant. The Second Circuit comes
close to transparency in American Geophysical by at least identifying the assumption that
61

Id. at 930.
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In several prominent cases it appears that the plaintiffs were unwilling to license at any price, whereas,

after the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell a settlement including an ongoing license was in fact
negotiated. See for example, Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir., 1987); New Era
Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583(2d Cir. 1989), Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir., 1966); and Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir., 2000).
63

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir., 1994) (emphasis added)
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it is making – that journal photocopying falls within the traditional, reasonable, and likely
to be developed market of the copyright owner – but it does little to actually justify this
assumption.
Such assumptions should be carefully considered, especially in the context of
market effect, because of the danger that courts will reason backwards from the fact of
marketability to the construct of property.64 The CCC was established in 1977 to license
photocopying after the decision in Williams & Wilkins.65 This begs the question: if a
centralized clearinghouse was established to license parody, review or reference to a class
of works, would it establish the existence of a “traditional,” “reasonable,” or “likely”
market for such activities?66 In Campbell, the Court held that there is no protectable
derivative market for criticism, including parody because:
“[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of
original works would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the
64

Julie Cohen makes this criticism in relation to the INS case in which the Supreme Court found a quasi-

property right in news based on a misappropriation theory. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner In Cyberspace: The
New Economic Orthodoxy Of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 507-508; see Int’l News Serv.
v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
65

It is tempting to speculate that had the CCC existed earlier, the decision in Williams & Wilkins would

have been the same as American Geophysical. However, this seems unlikely. The Court of Claims
considered and rejected the possibility of licensing schemes. In his dissenting opinion in American
Geophysical, Justice Jacobs argued that the CCC scheme was “neither traditional nor reasonable; and its
development into a real market is subject to substantial impediments.” American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 937 (2d Cir., 1994) (Jacobs J. dissent).
66

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 937 (2d Cir., 1994) (Jacobs J. dissent). See

also Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38-39.
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unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or
lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a
potential licensing market.”67
If the members of the MPAA established a rights clearing center for reviews and parodies
of, and references to their movies, would unauthorized review, reference and parody
suddenly cease to be fair use? There may be good reasons to not givecopyright owners to
expand control over certain uses of their works, even if they are offering to license those
uses.
As with the third factor, the fourth factor is conceptually important but
incomplete. In order to determine market effect, a court must first form some idea as to
what the market is, as emphasized by the Second Circuit’s holding that the market in
question must be traditional, reasonable or likely to develop. The problem with the fourth
factor, and with all the factors to some extent, is that they focus on second order
questions and invite courts to gloss over the real basis for their rulings – how they came
to define the boundaries of the copyright owner’s rights in the first place.68 To answer
this antecedent question, courts must look beyond the statutory guidance in Section 107
and confront theoretical questions about the nature of copyright.

67

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (emphasis added).
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Lloyd Weinreb argues that although the Supreme Court cast its analysis in Sony and Harper & Row

almost entirely in terms of the statutory factors, “the application, not to say the interpretation, of the factors
is so tailored to the circumstances of the cases, that one is impelled to look beneath the surface of the
opinions for the true ground of decision.” Lloyd L. Weinreb, The 1998 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture,
Fair Use, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1299. (1999).
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E.

The Search For Reasons

The four statutory factors that courts must consider in deciding fair use cases
provide a useful framework for analysis but they are far from complete. By mandating
that all decisions in this area at least consider the factors, the statute generates more finegrained points of comparison. All other things being equal, this should make fair use
decisions more consistent. However, judges need to recognize that the factors only
provide a framework for their analysis by raising certain second order questions.
Applying the factors still requires making first order assumptions as to the scope and
value of the copyright owner’s rights. This is particularly true of the third and fourth
factors, which require courts to first define the value of the copyrighted work, in order to
determine how much of the value of the work was used by the defendant, and also to
determine how the value of the work was affected by the defendant’s use. Neither of
these questions can be answered without first deciding what the value of the work is in
the abstract, or how far the copyright owner’s rights in relation to it should extend.
Courts inevitably fall back on assumptions as to what the legitimate scope of the
copyright owners’ rights should be. More precise articulation and more coherent
justification of those assumptions should lead to more predictable fair use decisions over
time because, to the extent that judges agree on these first order considerations, clearer
rules will emerge. Even where judges initially disagree, such disagreements will be
resolved by the usual considerations of precedent.
The remainder of this paper considers what kind of assumptions courts should be
making in fair use cases. As Parts II and III elaborate, the fundamental starting point for
the assumptions that fill the gaps in the statutory factors is an understanding of the
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dynamic nature of modern copyright law and the structural role of fair use. Part IV
examines the jurisprudential implications of the structural analysis of fair use and
recommends that judges should justify their assumptions as to the proper scope of the
copyright owner’s rights in terms of fundamental principles derived from copyright law
itself. This bounded normative inquiry is more likely to result in stability and
predictability than either a simple cost-benefit or unrestricted reference to normative
conceptions of the good in general.
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Part II – Copyright As An Evolving System
As noted in the previous part, the statutory formulation of the fair use doctrine
raises significantly more questions than it answers. The indeterminacy of the statutory
factors stems from congressional recognition of the need judicial policy making. Fair use
is the mechanism by which Congress has transferred a significant policy making to
judges, to allow copyright to adapt to ongoing social and technological change more
effectively than a purely legislative response would allow. Doctrinal recommendations
that do not take account of this structural role of fair use are necessarily limited in their
descriptive of prescriptive analysis. Some of these attempts and their weaknesses are
considered Part IV. Understanding the structural role of fair use in copyright law is the
first step towards developing a more coherent fair use doctrine. This part examines the
overall structure of modern copyright law as the context for understanding the structural
role of fair use.
The Copyright Act of 1976 can be seen as the culmination of the transformation
of American copyright law, from the regulation of literal reproduction to a system of
general rights which protects the more abstract notion of the value of creative and
intellectual works.69 This transformation has greatly expanded the number of works
covered by copyright, and the political and economic significance of the rights that
copyright vests in authors and their assignees. Copyright’s transformation and associated
expansion have been viewed with alarm by many in the academic community because of
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Oren Bracha, From Privilege To Print To Ownership Of Works: The Transformation Of American

Copyright Law 1790 – 1909 (2004). (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University Law School) (on
file with author).
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the perceived threat to free speech, innovation and creativity.70 The expansion of
copyright has also been criticized as a victory for special interests – publishers,
broadcasters, the recording industry and movie studios – over the generalized public
interest in the free exchange of information.71
Without necessarily disputing any of these claims, this article tells another story
about the significance of the changes in the structure of American copyright law. The
effects of copyright law are prone to technological disruption. Even preceding the digital
age, new technology such as the juke box and the photocopier conflicted with people’s
settled expectations of the rights of copyright owners and the freedoms of the public. In
1976, Congress decided to alter the structure of copyright law to make it more responsive
to technological change. Congress replaced potentially limited and technologically
specific rights with rights that were more broadly expressed, in order to allow copyright
law to be more flexible in its treatment of new technologies.
The 1976 Act was a significant departure from its predecessor in a number of
respects. Three changes greatly increased the number of works subject to copyright and
the duration of copyright protection for those works. First, the new Act changed the
default rule for the application of copyright, from opt-in to opt-out. Under the 1909 Act,
an eligible work received no federal copyright protection until its publication, and even
70

See for example, Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2; Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice

and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283
(1996).
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JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 53 (2001); and Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired,

Jan. 1996, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html.
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then only if certain formalities were observed.72 In contrast, the 1976 Act applies to all
eligible works from the moment of their creation, although until 1989 it was still the case
that a work published without the proper form of copyright notice would instantly
become part of the public domain.73 Second, the new Act increased the maximum
duration of copyright protection from 56 years from the date of publication, to the life of
the author plus 50 years for most natural persons and 75 years from the year of first
publication for anonymous works, pseudonymous works and works made for hire.74
Third, the new Act jettisoned the requirement of copyright renewal, thus extending
copyright protection even more significantly for the vast majority of owners who failed to
renew their terms after the initial 28 year period.75 The cumulative effect of these
extensions was that more works were protected by copyright and that copyright
protection lasted considerably longer.
Although these changes are significant, there was a much more fundamental
change to the nature of copyright itself: the broadening of the copyright owner’s
exclusive rights. The 1976 Act significantly increased the scope of copyright owner’s
rights by rephrasing them in considerably more general terms.

72

The 1909 Act expressly allowed the state common law copyright to protect unpublished works.
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Jessica Litman, Sharing And Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 15 (2004). See for example, J.
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The new Act gave copyright owners five “fundamental rights” to be offset against
subsequent exceptions.76
The approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright owner's exclusive rights in
broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various limitations, qualifications,
or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus, everything in section 106 is
made "subject to sections 107 through 118," and must be read in conjunction with
those provisions.77
The contrast in drafting styles between the two Acts is significant. The 1909 Act granted
rights that were static in nature and had to be constantly retrofitted by Congress.78
Public choice theory predicts that legislative outcomes will be the product of
interest group competition in a political market place.79 In that political marketplace,
small groups with concentrated interests will mobilize more effectively than large groups

76

The exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. See House

Report No. 94-1476; 17 USC 106 (1) through (5). In 1995 Congress added the digital audio transmission
right specifically reserved for sound recordings, 17 USC 106(6), Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
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with diffuse interests. The application of public choice theory to the 1976 Act is fairly
obvious: well represented copyright holders, such as the media, received a significant
increase in both the scope and duration of protection; well represented copyright users
such as libraries received special treatment by way of exemptions; the unrepresented
public discovered that their residual freedoms, and the public domain, had decreased
accordingly.80
In her book, Digital Copyright, Jessica Litman provides a compelling and detailed
account of the decades of protracted negotiation that that led to the passage of the 1976
Act. Two related features stand out in this account: (1) revising the Copyright Act has
proved difficult and time consuming; (2) special interest group representatives have had
an unusually direct influence in drafting the new Copyright Act.
The first major revision of the Copyright Act in the 20th century was completed in
1909; it took until 1976 to achieve another one. The intervening period witnessed the
Depression, two world wars, and the invention of a variety of devices that would come to
transform copyright, including : talking motion pictures, the radio tuner, television, the
jukebox, the photocopier, the computer, videotape recorders and musical synthesizers.
During this period, there were almost continual but unsuccessful efforts by both Congress
and various interest groups to revise the 1909 Act in light of these developments.
Litman offers a standard public choice explanation for the revised structure of the
Copyright Act that was eventually passed in 1976: conflicts between represented interests
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Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71. Peter Drahos tells the same story on a global scale concerning

the 1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the adoption of the TRIPS agreement, see PETER
DRAHOS, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2001).
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were solved by increasing the surplus to be divided (by expanding copyright) at the
expense of the greater public.81 The public choice account is convincing in its own terms,
but it overlooks the considerable merit of adopting a dynamic copyright structure. To
understand why this is so, and the significance for fair use, it is helpful to consider some
of the literature on the choice between rules and standards.
In an ideal world, copyright law would accommodate at least three different
constraints: incentive optimization, administrative efficiency and adaptability. First, the
law would create sufficient incentives to encourage and sustain the production of
society’s optimal level and quality of intellectual and creative output. Second, the rights
established by that law would be sufficiently certain to allow them to be observed and
enforced with minimal administrative and transaction costs. Finally, the law would adapt
to social and technological change, so that it continued to comply with the optimization
and administrative efficiency criteria.
Obviously no such law exists. In fact, there is an inherent tension between the
administrative efficiency criteria and adaptability criteria. In theory, laws that are more
specific have a lower cost of administration, but that same specificity makes them more
likely to produce undesirable or paradoxical results in response to unforeseen situations.
In other words, specific laws are prone to obsolescence. At least three considerations
govern the legislative choice to make laws more or less specific. First, although rules are
associated with lower compliance costs, they are typically harder to write in the first
place. In contrast, a legislative standard is easier to write but shifts costs from the law
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Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71.
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making body to those who must comply with the law because of both information costs
and uncertainty.82
The second consideration in choosing between rules and standards is determining
how the law should change in response to new circumstances. Laws which are
dramatically affected by social and technological change must be regularly adapted to
new circumstances. Received wisdom tells us that standards are easier to keep up-to-date
than rules.83 Standards do not require continual legislative intervention to adapt to
changing circumstances because they are only given content through their application to
particular situations. Accordingly, in spite of their increased compliance costs, standards
may be preferable where the opportunities for legislative resolution are limited; this
observation leads directly to the third consideration, public choice theory.
As noted above, public choice theory holds that interest group competition affects
legislative outcomes. An important extension of simple public choice theory also
suggests that interest group competition in a multiple veto-point political system affects
legislative style as well as policy direction.84 The active involvement of a number of
interest groups with non-aligned or only partially aligned interests makes finding a
specific compromise on any particular issue difficult. The more interest groups, the more
difficult that prospect will be. In the U.S., building consensus is even more difficult
because the complexity of the legislative process results in multiple veto points.85 The
82

Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
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passage of legislation requires a majority in the relevant committees, the House, the
Senate and Presidential approval. The more specific a bill is, the more difficult it is likely
to be to secure all the required majorities.
Obstacles to more specific legislation may have a compounding effect in an
environment that is known to be prone to external shocks. The parties involved should
anticipate that if legislation was difficult to pass initially, it will also be difficult to amend
in response to unforeseen circumstances. A risk averse interest group might prefer
incomplete legislation which transfers the forum of conflict from a one-shot legislative
solution to an ongoing judicial process. Consistent with this theory, Attiyah and Summers
have commented that Congress adopts incomplete policy instruments and relies on case
law to determine the content of the law, more than other comparable nations.86
Incomplete legislation does not lead to anarchy: where Congress fails to act,
courts fill the void, completing incomplete policies in a process that is only nominally
interpretive.87 In spite of frequent references to ‘activist judges’ in political rhetoric,
judicial policy making may arise as much from legislative abdication as from judicial
usurpation. Indeed, there is a view that Congress routinely passes the task of resolving
unpleasant political issues to the courts.88 For example, Congress could have resolved the
issue of home video taping through legislative action before the Supreme Court was

86
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forced reach the issue in Sony; but the “chance to do nothing and blame it on another
branch of government was predictably hard for Congress to resist.”89
In sum, where Congress knows that a specific policy provision would be initially
difficult to draft, would be rapidly made obsolete by external changes, and would be
difficult to rewrite in response to those changes, it may rationally (or expediently) choose
to enact an incomplete policy, leaving it to the courts to add content to that standard by
applying it to particular situations as they arise. Congress’ broad definition of the rights
of copyright owners and its incomplete codification of the fair use doctrine both fit neatly
with this description.
Congress’ intention in recasting the exclusive rights in such broad language in the
1976 Act was to change the way copyright law dealt with new technology. Previously,
courts had typically resisted extending copyright protection to new technologies without
explicit legislative guidance.90 The adoption of broadly stated exclusive rights in the new
Act was intended to “change the old pattern and enact a statute that would cover new
technologies, as well as old.”91
The legislative history shows that Congress was aware of the extent to which the
existing balance of copyright protection had been disrupted by past technologies, such as

89
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the player piano and the photocopier.92 The congressional record also indicates that
Congress realized that it was not in a position to anticipate the implications of social and
technological changes yet to occur.93 Just as Congress was aware of the difficulty, ex
ante, of specifying the application of copyright to technological developments, it was also
aware of the unlikelihood that it would be able to respond ex post, in a manner that was
either timely or effective.94 In short, Congress appears to have understood that any new
copyright law would have to broadly expressed to allow it to respond dynamically to
unforeseen events because the politics of copyright reform were such that its own ability
to respond would be limited. The shift to a dynamic copyright regime, implemented in
the 1976 Act, may have been the product of special interest politics, but it was also sound
public policy in light of copyright’s susceptibility to technological change.
One of the first technologies to put the 1976 Act to the test was the VCR. In 1984,
the Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of the VCR, Sony, was not liable for
selling a machine that could lead to widespread reproduction of copyrighted materials.95
This ruling indicated to some that the courts would be unable or unwilling to adapt
copyright to embrace new technology as Congress intended. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s
dissent criticized the majority on just that basis.
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It is no answer, of course, to refer to and stress, … this Court's “consistent
deference to Congress” whenever “major technological innovations” appear.
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the Court has tended to
evade the hard issues when they arise in the area of copyright law. I see no reason
for the Court to be particularly pleased with this tradition or to continue it. Indeed,
it is fairly clear from the legislative history of the 1976 Act that Congress meant
to change the old pattern and enact a statute that would cover new technologies,
as well as old.96
The majority stressed the importance of allowing Congress to determine the
appropriate response to new technology throughout its decision.
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned
the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to
authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work
product.
…
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have
made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a
flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible..97
However, the rhetoric of deference employed by the majority must be carefully
assessed in light of its actual ruling. The majority did not find the Copyright Act
inapplicable to the video cassette recorders; nor did it hold that new technology always
required new legislation. What it did say was that under the current law, although other
forms of reproduction using a VCR may have been infringing, non-commercial timeshifting constituted a fair use of the new technology. The majority did apply the new Act
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Id. at 429, 456 (1984). See also Id. at 431 (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent

deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”)

34

Working Paper, March 2005 Draft

to the VCR as Congress intended, whether that application was the same as the one
Congress might have made is another question altogether.
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Part III – Fair Use In The Context Of An Evolving Copyright System
One of the criticisms of the new copyright regime implemented in 1976 is that the
interaction of broadly expressed exclusive rights with narrowly crafted exceptions has a
ratcheting effect on copyright protection. The rights of copyright owner s adapt to
technological challenges, whereas users’ rights are diminished or marginalized. This
concern is particularly pronounced with respect to the possible effects of restrictive
licensing and technological measures, such as digital rightsmanagement. The expectation
that fair use should preserve the balance of copyright assumes there is one unique and
identifiable balance to be preserved, it also assumes thatthe past is a better reflection of
that balance than the present. If the function of fair use was to preserve users’ rights, or
maintain the status quo, it would appear to be failing dismally.
On the other hand, if the success of fair use is measured by the extent to which
has enabled copyright law to smoothly adapt to new challenges, fair use is doing pretty
well. Understanding fair use from a structural perspective tells us something more about
fair use than is revealed by the observation of individual cases. The structure of the
Copyright Act and the history of copyright law indicate that the true function of fair use
is to enable copyright law to evolve in response to new challenges without necessitating
legislative intervention. As this section elaborates, fair use is fundamentally different to
the majority of other exceptions that limit the rights of copyright owners because it is
both dynamic (unlike most exceptions) and contextual (unlike the idea expression
distinction). Significantly, like the idea expression distinction, fair use is also a
constitutionally required feature of copyright law. All of this makes fair use very
significant. In addition, a structural analysis of fair use indicates that the doctrine is meant
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to be used as a flexible standard through which the judiciary can determine the
application of copyright in response to social and technological changes – fair use was
never intended to preserve the status quo in the face of change.
A.

The Nature Of Fair Use

Unlike the most other exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, fair
use is a dynamic standard. As a statement of legislative policy, the fair use doctrine is
undeniably vague. Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that “the fair use of a
copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright.” Section 107 also provides a nonexclusive list of six examples of fair use (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research) and four nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in applying the doctrine. The vagueness of the fair
use provision stands in marked contrast to the specificity of many other sections of the
Act, and it begs the question of why Congress adopted rules in some places and standards
in others.
The narrowness of the static exemptions is easily illustrated. The Act creates a
statutory exemption allowing libraries to copy an existing published work to a new
format if the existing format has become obsolete.98 There is no privilege to upgrade to a
format that is merely superior or more convenient, and persons other than libraries have
no such express right at all. Many other exemptions follow a similar pattern, applying
only to a particular special interest and only with respect to a limited class of conduct.
The Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) of 1992 demonstrates the limitations
of the Act’s many static exemptions. The AHRA reflects a deal between music industry
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interests and device manufacturers. Under that deal, device manufactures agreed to pay
royalties for, and include technological limitations in, digital audio recording devices.99
In return for these royalties and technological restrictions, music industry interests
consented to a provision in the Copyright Act which immunizes noncommercial copying
using a digital audio recording device or a digital audio recording medium.100
The AHRA was a static and narrow solution to a particular problem, Congress
could have legislated as to the legality of consumer home audio copying more generally,
but failed to do so. The AHRA has no application to a consumer who converts CDs to
MP3 files, nor do the royalty provisions apply to MP3 players.101 Consequently, the
AHRA amendments to the Copyright Act have been entirely inconsequential in the public
furor that has surrounded MP3s, file-sharing and webcasting in the past few years. As the
AHRA illustrates, in a fast-changing environment, even detailed rulesthat perfectly
address a group’s concerns tend to ultimately fail in that aim.
Unlike the idea expression distinction, fair use contextual. This difference has
important implications. The idea expression distinction is dynamic and universal in its
application. The idea expression distinction, which holds that “no author may copyright
his ideas or the facts he narrates,”102 is one of the fundamental axioms of copyright law.
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information contained in an
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author’s work, it merely protects the expression of those ideas and information.103 The
idea expression distinction is not an exemption from copyright, it is statement of one of
its inherent limitations in scope.104
The idea expression distinction is very important but it is not the appropriate
vehicle to resolve every tension in copyright, because it does not contextualize. For
example, the idea expression distinction does not provide a means to distinguish between
the partial copying of a work for an academic or critical purpose and the same conduct
for some less-favored purpose. Nor can it be used to take account of the difference
between private use and non-private use. The idea expression distinction focuses solely
on the alleged copying in question; it does not take into account the circumstances,
effects and motivations surrounding that copying.105 Thus the idea expression distinction
protects a computer programmer who copies an application protocol interface (“API” ) to
enable her program to interface with the original, but it does not protect the copying of
the entire program that was part of the reverse engineering process that uncovered the
API in the first place.106 However, reverse engineering is protected by fair use.107
103

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-219 (2003).

104

17 USC 102(b). Section 102 of the Copyright Act sets out the subject matter of copyright and also states

that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”
105

This follows under either the ordinary observer test, or a more structured inquiry, Nichols v. Universal

Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (observer test for substantial similarity); Computer Assocs.
Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir., 1992) (abstraction, filtration comparison test for substantial
similarity).
106

See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2000).
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The difference between the idea expression distinction and fair use is particularly
important to understand because the two are so often confused.108 An example of the
confusion between the idea expression distinction and fair use is the mode of criticism
directed at a series of admittedly problematic cases. In Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Carol Publishing Group, Inc., a district court held that The Joy of Trek, a guidebook for
the Star Trek uninitiated, infringed the copyright in the original series.109 In Castle Rock
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the Second Circuit held that The
Seinfeld Aptitude Test, literally a sequence of hundreds of trivia questions and answers
relating to the Seinfeld series, also infringed the copyright in the original series.110 In each
case the amount of expression from any individual broadcast or the series in total was
slight and fragmentary, but remarkably the courts had little trouble characterizing the
guide book and the aptitude test as substantially similar to the plaintiff’s copyrighted
work. A number of scholars, such as Matthew Bunker,111 have characterized these

107

Id.

108

4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03 (defense of fair use often invoked without reference to the particular

use employed by the defendant, and merely as an alternative label for similarity that is not infringing
because it is not substantial).
109

Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

110

Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141(2d Cir. 1998) .

111

Matthew Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The "Transformative" Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 Comm. L. &

Pol’y 1, 10 – 16. Bunker also criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s Dr. Seuss opinion on the same grounds. Id. But
that case may have been soundly decided based on the similarities between the defendant’s back cover
illustration and the plaintiff’s book, as opposed to “similarities in typeface, poetic meter, whimsical style or
visual style.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir., 1997).
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decisions as misapplications of the fair use doctrine. These decisions are extraordinary,
but not primarily by virtue of their failure to find fair use.
In these cases, courts appear to have mischaracterized as derivative works, works
that simply reference but do not reproduce the plaintiffs’ copyrighted material. If we
suspend disbelief and assume that, the work of the defendants in these cases was indeed
substantially similar to that of the plaintiffs, and that the extent of that similarity was
significantly more than was required for their analysis or criticism of the original, then
the courts were correct to find in favor of the plaintiffs. The courts in Paramount and
Castle Rock appear to have confused potential profit for protectable interest. The mere
fact that the defendant was attempting to profit by catering to the significant public
interest in Seinfeld and Star Trek does not establish any protectable similarity between
books discussing the television programs and the programs themselves.
Fair use has a significant structural role in copyright, relying on fair use to make
up for erroneous decisions on whether there was presumptively actionable copying in the
first place can only further distort and confuse fair use analysis. Fair use is structurally
unique among all the limitations and exception to copyright rights, because it is both
dynamic and contextual. The Structural role of fair use does not include playing catcher
every time a judge misses the ball.
B.

The Roles Of Fair Use

Given the 1976 Act’s grant of expansive and pervasive copyright rights, fair use
has a role to play in maintaining a constitutionally acceptable balance between copyright
and freedom of speech. This role warrants brief description but is well understood. What
is less recognized but equally important is fair use’s structural role within copyright. The
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First Amendment provides that in part that Congress “shall make no law… abridging the
freedom of speech.”112 As a consequence, government restrictions on speech, such as
laws against flag burning,113 and private law actions that effect speech, such as libel,114
are greatly restricted by the First Amendment. Copyright is a federal law that restricts
speech by creating an exclusive property right in original expression contained in a
tangible medium, albeit for a limited time. The possibility that copyright has a harmful
effect on freedom of speech has increased because of the expansion of copyright
ownership as discussed in the previous section. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that copyright does not present a danger to freedom of speech because
of the idea expression distinction and the fair use doctrine, copyright’s “own speechprotective purposes and safeguards.”115
Fair use serves an important constitutional role in maintaining a balance between
establishing incentives for the creation of works and guaranteeing sufficient access to
those works to preserve a constitutionally acceptable level of freedom of speech.
However, as Rebecca Tushnet observes, it would be a mistake to simply equate the scope
of fair use with the scope of freedom of speech required by the constitution – the two

112

USCS Const. Amend. 1.

113

Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

114

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

115

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-219 (2003). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation

Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 - 558 (1985).
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concepts are interrelated but they are not coterminous.116 More is required of fair use than
simply satisfying the requirements of the First Amendment.
Fair use turns out to be the final arbiter of the rights of the copyright owner in a
broad range of situations. Current and recently decided fair use cases have asked courts in
various jurisdictions to determine whether and to what extent:
•

a defendant was entitled to base a test preparation on a copyrighted reference
book;117

•

a large computer hardware manufacturer was entitled to copy illustrations and
phrases from a guide to computer injury prevention for use in its own from
safety guide;118

•

a city police department was entitled to display a criminal defendant’s
photographs in the course of its investigation;119

•

a hip-hop magazine was entitled to copy and distribute the early unpublished
works of a prominent recording artist to expose his alleged racism;120

•

a public interest group was entitled to publish a private company’s internal
emails relating to its electronic voting machines, to inform the public about
alleged problems associated with those electronic voting machines;121 and

116

Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying

Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). Tushnet argues that fair use alone may not be enough to clear
copyright of all First Amendment concerns.
117

Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir., 2004).

118

Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir., 2004).

119

Shell v. City of Radford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190 (D. Va., 2005).

120

Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26143 (D.N.Y., 2004).
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•

a defendant was entitled to publish a book containing its own photographs of
the plaintiff’s copyrighted Beanie Babies.122

It seems unlikely that any consistent theme will emerge from the ultimate
disposition or settlement of these cases. Nonetheless, these cases are conceptually linked.
In each case the broad statement of the rights of the copyright owner set out in the
Copyright Act is incomplete – it does not by itself determine the ability of the copyright
owner to control the use of his or her work.
While others have suggested that fair use should be seen as more than “a
grudgingly tolerated exception to the copyright owner’s rights of private property,” 123
typically these explanations stop short with the observation that the exclusive rights can
not be absolute. 124 Once that point is conceded, it still remains to be answered why fair
use is necessary in addition to the specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses and
the idea expression distinction.
Indeed, fair use is not a necessary or inevitable feature of copyright law in the
abstract – it is nonetheless a fundamental principle of the our copyright law today. In
theory, the role played by fair use in limiting the rights of copyright owners could be
performed by specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses, or a more concrete
statement of rights in the first place. Alternatively or in addition, we could rely on high
enforcement costs, private ordering solutions and norms of forbearance and reciprocity to
moderate any adverse effects of overbroad copyright protection.
121

Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (D. Cal., 2004).

122

Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 333 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707 (D. Ill., 2004).

123

Leval, supra note 29, at 1135- 1136.

124

Id. at 1136.
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In spite of the theoretical possibility of copyright without fair use, copyright law
has in fact developed a fundamental role for the doctrine. From its inception, the fair use
doctrine has facilitated the expansion of copyright by providing a flexible limiting
principle that defines the outer limits of the copyright owners’ rights.125 As discussed in
the previous section, in 1976 Congress again significantly expanded the rights of
copyright owners by rephrasing their exclusive rights in broad technologically neutral
terms. At the same time, Congress transferred significant policy making responsibility to
the courts by incorporating fair use as a flexible standard in the 1976 Act. It is not a
coincidence that Congress chose to codify fair use as a standard at the same time that it
radically expanded copyright rights in the 1976 Act.
On an operational level, findings of fair use establish both limits on the rights of
copyright owners and affirmative rights in the hands of users. However, it would be a
mistake to view the function of fair use as restraining copyright owners or empowering
users for its own sake. Structurally, fair use transfers significant policy making
responsibility to the judiciary, allowing judges to develop the law in response to external
changes. This structural role of fair use is significant because of the perceived inability of
the legislative process to keep pace with the demands of rapid technological and social
changes. A flexible forward looking set of owner’s rights, combined with a flexible fair
use doctrine, allows Congress to legislate less frequently and entrust significant policy
responsibility to the judiciary.
Judicial policy making may trouble those bound up in literalist theories of
democracy, but it is not without precedent. Courts exert a significant policy making role

125

Sub
- section C.1. explains the origins of fair use in more detail.
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in other areas, such as antitrust law. The fair use doctrine requires courts to determine the
limits of the copyright monopoly and adapt copyright law in response to both incremental
changes and external shocks.126 The role of fair use is especially significant given the
impact of new technology on copyright.
This is not meant to convey the impression that Congress has somehow limited its
capacity to provide legislative solutions to the questions raised by new technology. On
the contrary, Congress can and should continue to play an active role in the development
of copyright law. What it does mean is that Congress does not need to rush to legislative
solutions and that it need not fear that its inaction will bring the system to grinding halt.
There are two aspects to the structural role of fair use. First, fair use provides the
flexible and dynamic boundary on copyright rights that makes their expansive and
flexible definition feasible. Second, a flexible and dynamic copyright system necessitates
giving judges significant policy making power over both the application of copyright
rights and the fair use doctrine. Congress could have relied on specific codified
exceptions to the exclusive rights instead of a dynamic fair use standard. However,
specific exceptions face the same problems as specific owner’s rights – they require
constant revision in the face of social and technological changes affecting copyright. The
rationale for broad and dynamic exclusive rights is equally applicable fair use, flexibility
requires delegation. Realistically, Congress is institutionally incapable of legislating on
copyright with the frequency that would be demanded under a system with more specific

126

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). (“The fair use doctrine thus permits and

requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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rights and exemptions due to the daily changes in the environment in which those rights
are exercised.
Structurally, fair use is both a point of flexibility within copyright and a
mechanism of delegation. Copyright protection has lengthened, broadened and deepened
as a result of the 1976 Act; fair use cannot be expected to counteract these reforms, its
role is to adapt the law Congress has made to society’s changing needs.
C.

The Effect of the Structural Role Of Fair Use on Copyright Owners

Fair use has been characterized as a “tax” on copyright owners, a “subsidy” in
favor of particular groups,127 and a fundamental right of the public in relation to
copyrighted works.128 All of these characterizations miss the mark because of their focus
on the case-by- case operation of the fair use doctrine, as opposed to its overall structural
function.
Fair use is more than sum total of winners and losers of particular cases; from a
structural perspective, fair use provides a point of flexibility in copyright law that
facilitates adjustment to unforeseen changes. One implication of fair use’s structural role
is that that it advantages copyright owners as a class. The claim that fair use systemically
advantages copyright owners is not susceptible to empirical proof: it relies on comparison
with a non-existent world in there was no fair use doctrine as we know it today. In order
to make the case that fair use advantages copyright owners, I examine the origins of the

127

Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-

Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997); See Cohen, supra note 64 at footnote 5 for other
similar references.
128

DanThu Thi Phan, Will Fair Use Function On The Internet?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 212 (1998).
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doctrine in the 19th century and the application of fair use today in the debate over private
sphere uses of copyrighted works.
1.

The Origins Of Fair Use

The fair use doctrine emerged as part of copyright’s shift in focus in the 19th
century, from an economic privilege of the printing industry to a system of rights
centered around an abstract notion of authorship.129 In the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, copyright in both England and the U.S. was confined to “the sole right and
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” protected works such as books,
maps and charts.130 In spite of the nominal switch from printer’s monopoly to author’s
right achieved by the Statute of Anne in 1710, copyright remained firmly rooted in the
practices and technology of printing until the mid-1800s.131 In the early 1800s, copyright
infringement was limited to verbatim reproduction, or replication with only colorable
changes made merely to evade the copyright owner’s rights.132
129

Bracha, supra note 69.

130

U.S. Copyright Act 1790, Section 1. (Protected matter itself limited to maps, charts and books). English

law was similar at the time. Loren, supra note 66, 13.
131

The simplicity of this general characterization is not intended to deny the existence of a more complex

historical process or suggest that this transformation was entirely even. For a more detailed account, see
Bracha, supra note 69.
132

See Loren, supra note 66,13-15; Bracha, supra note 69, at 36; See Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141 143, 26

Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (Ch.1740). In Cary v. Kearsley, Lord Ellenborough declared, “[the presence of] part of
the work of one author is found in another, is not of itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man
may fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use of another’s labors for the promotion of
science, and the benefit of the public.” Cary v. Kearsley 4 Esp. 168, 170 (1802) (emphasis added) (spelling
modernized).
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In 1839 in Gray v. Russell, Justice Story signaled his view that copyright
infringement should extend well beyond verbatim and evasive reproduction, in order to
protect the “quintessence” of the work and its economic value, not just the owner’s
interest in printing. 133 Justice Story began this expansion in Gray v. Russell by qualifying
the previously understood position that an abridgment of an existing work did not
constitute infringement, a proposition that in Justice Story’s words “must be received
with many qualifications.”134
Two years later in the case of Folsom v. Marsh,135 Justice Story was able to
further articulate the substance of those qualifications, giving rise to what would become
known as the fair use doctrine. Justice Story ruled that to determine whether a selection
from a copyrighted work constituted copyright infringement courts must:
look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.136
This formulation not only encapsulated the fair use doctrine prior to its codification in the
1976 Copyright Act, but the influence of Justice Story’s summary also remains
discernible in the statute’s four factors which dominate judicial analysis of fair use
today.137
Both Gray and Folsom cast the rights of the copyright owner in terms of the
market value of the work in question, as opposed to narrow rights of literal or evasive
133

Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (No. 5,728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).

134

Id.

135

9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

136

Id. at 348.

137

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
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reproduction. The centrality of market value in Justice Story’s abstraction of the
protected work is manifest. In Gray v. Russell he explained the need to protect the work,
both from extracts that sought to “supersede the original work under the pretence of a
review,” and abridgments which “by the omission of some unimportant parts… prejudice
or supersede the original work” or compete with the original in “the same class of
readers.”138 These points were reiterated in Folsom v. Marsh:
It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of the original
work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held to be such
an abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and
intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of
the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the
original work.139
Fair use was not only coincident with this significant expansion in the rights of
copyright owners, it was the fundamental doctrinal tool facilitating that expansion.
During the 19th century, copyright began to outgrow literalism and refocused around a
broader and more conceptually challenging notion of the work as an abstract object with
economic value. Before fair use, copyright owners’ rights were narrowly defined and the
public at large retained a broad freedom to, among other things, extract and abridge
existing works. Fair use enabled a significant expansion of owners’ rights by establishing
a limiting principle that subordinated the public’s interest in the use copyrighted works to
the owner’s economic interests; an irony that is often lost on modern observers.140 Fair
use is seen as a limitation on the rights of copyright owners, but it actually serves a
structurally expansive role in relation to those rights.
138

Gray v Russell, Id. At 1038.

139

Folsom v Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (citations omitted).

140

Bracha, supra note 69.
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2.

Fair Use And Private Sphere Activity

Operationally, fair use may appear to benefit members of the public by limiting
the rights of copyright owners; nonetheless, structurally, fair use advantages copyright
owners as a class by allowing their rights to be more expansively defined a priori. This
tension between the structural and operational aspects of the fair use doctrine continues
into the present day. The structural role of fair use in this regard can be seen most readily
in relation to the regulation of the use of copyrighted material in the private sphere. In the
domestic context, fair use has been effectively used by the courts to develop copyright
law with more subtlety than Congress could have conceivably achieved legislating before
the fact, and possibly even after. This illustrates the interrelationship between fair use’s
two structural roles. First, fair use is the flexible counter-weight that enables flexible
copyright rights. Second, that flexibility is achieved by congressional delegation of
substantial policy making responsibility to the judiciary. The flexible design of both the
exclusive rights and of fair use require judges to adapt copyright to changing
circumstances, rather than waiting for congressional guidance which may never arrive.
The extent to which copyright owners can regulate the use of copyrighted material
in the private sphere is one of the most compelling and enduring issues in modern
copyright law. Traditionally, copyright owners have exercised very limited rights with
respect to use of their works in the home for a number of reasons: lack of commercial
significance of those uses, uncertainty as to the application of the rights, and practical
difficulties in enforcement. According to Litman, the scope of allowable copying in the
private sphere received little explicit attention in the revision process for the 1976 Act.141

141

Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71, at 52.
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Congress’ failure to say anything on the legality of private copying has been roundly
criticized, but unfairly so.142 Congressional silence on the issue has in fact allowed the
law relating to private copying to develop in a more nuanced fashion than would have
been possible if Congress had acted more decisively.
Presumably, when the last major revision to Copyright Act was finally passed in
1976, Congress would have been aware that issues would arise in relation to the private
use of copyrighted material.143 Given that awareness, Congress was faced with several
choices: (1) make private use expressly immune from copyright; (2) make private use
expressly subject to copyright; (3) try to specify which private uses were immune to
copyright, leaving the remainder subject to copyright; (4) conversely, try to specify which
private uses were subject to copyright, leaving the remainder immune to copyright; or (5)
do nothing and leave it to the courts to determine. As discussed in Part I, in drafting the
1976 Act, Congress was unusually sensitized to its own inability to predict the how
technological change would effect the balance between copyright owners and the public.
As part of the dynamic structure adopted in 1976, Congress opted by omission to leave
questions relating to the private use of copyrighted material to the courts to resolve by

142

Litman criticizes the omission because it has allowed regulation of private copying. Id.. Goldstein takes

the opposite view and comments that “[t]he silence of Congress on the issue of private copies has left a
black hole in the centre of American copyright legislation.” Goldstein, supra note 89, at 107.
143

See, for example, the exchange between Representative Beister and the Assistant Register of Copyrights

in relation to off-the-air recording by consumers. June, 1971, Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 445 (D. Cal.,
1979)
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applying the fair use doctrine. Doing so was the only practical solution given Congress’
preference for expansive and dynamic exclusive rights.
If Congress had take option 1 in 1976 and exempted private copying of
copyrighted works from copyright liability, it would have done so in total ignorance of
the potential effects of this choice. In 1976, Congress could not have realized the
potential of personal computers and other devices linked via non-commercial peer-topeer networks to displace commercial distribution of music, film, television, video
games, and books.144 It is now apparent that unauthorized peer-to-peer file-sharing of
copyrighted works is unlawful, regardless of whether it is non-commercial or takes place
purely within the privacy of private homes or college dormitories. Unlike unauthorized
home video recording for the purpose of time-shifting, unauthorized file-sharing is not
fair use.145 The Supreme Court is currently considering under what circumstances the
distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing software may be held liable for uses of their
software that infringe third party copyrights.146 Some commentators argue that
unauthorized file-sharing should be treated as fair use, or else covered by some form of
compulsory license.147 Interestingly, Justice Stevens’ first draft of the Sony decision took

144

Goldstein, supra note 89, at 106.

145

A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir., 2001) (unauthorized P2P file-sharing not fair

use); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir., 2004) (direct infringement by
users of P2P file-sharing service undisputed.)
146

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (certiorari granted).

147

Raymond S. Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital

Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (fair use); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial
Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 1 (2003) (compulsory license),
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the view that the exclusive rights of copyright owners had no application in theprivate
sphere as a matter of statutory interpretation.148 However, since Sony, drawing any kind
of bright-line distinction between public and private has become increasingly problematic
because of the increased capacity of private individuals to rip, mix, burn and most
importantly, file-share.
On the other hand, if Congress had adopted option 2 and made no allowance for
the private use of copyrighted material, the resulting law would have been both
extraordinarily oppressive and unpopular. First, Congress probably could not have
anticipated that the exclusive reproduction right it bestowed on copyright owners would
be effectively transformed into an exclusive use right in the digital context. Consider that
the user of a book simply picks it up and begins to read; whereas, the equivalent activity
in a digital medium requires first making a copy in random access memory of a
computer.149 It is seems unlikely that the public could be expected to tolerate this radical
expansion of copyright without some assurance that their rights to use copyrighted
material in the ways they had always used it would not be too greatly effected. Fair use
provides that assurance, albeit somewhat uncertainly at the margins.
Second, on their face, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are infringed by
any number of seemingly harmless private activities . Examples include: time-shifting
broadcast television (copying); converting music on CD into a format compatible with a
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT
(2004) (same).
148

Goldstein, supra note 89, at 122.

149

See, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). See also 2-8 Nimmer

on Copyright § 8.08.
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portable device (also copying); 150 and singing “Happy Birthday To You” at a restaurant
open to the public (public performance).151 That these examples do not constitute
copyright infringement illustrates a more general principle: the exclusive rights of
copyright owners are not absolute, their application varies according to the context.152
The blanket solutions of option 1 and option 2 are infeasible; what of options 3
and 4? To some extent, Congress has pursued option 3 in an attempt to strike a balance
between the interests of owners and the public in relation to private use of copyrighted

150

There is considerable debate over whether time shifting and format shifting are in fact harmless, but it is

safe to say most people think they are. See Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, Music Downloading, Filesharing and Copyright: A Pew Internet Project Data Memo, July 2003 (finding that 67% of Internet users
who download music don’t care whether the music they download is copyrighted), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf. Even the Recording Industry
Association of America acknowledges that consumers are entitled to make copies of their own CDs for
personal use on computers and portable music players. Presumably, the fair use doctrine is the source of
that entitlement. See the RIAA website at http://www.riaa.com/issues/ask/default.asp#stand (last visited
May 11, 2004) (on file with author).
151

The Copyright Act only gives copyright owners an exclusive right to the public performance of a

musical work, however, the statutory definition of when a work is performed “publicly” appears broad
enough to include a restaurant so long as it is “open to the public” or “a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances” can gather there. 17 USC 101. Whether
“Happy Birthday To You” is in fact still subject to copyright is subject to some uncertainty, see Litman,
Sharing, supra note 73, at 50, and footnote 111; Scott M. Martin, The Mythology Of The Public Domain:
Exploring The Myths Behind Attacks On The Duration Of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253,
322, footnote 61 (2002).
152

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (the law has never

recognized an author’s right to absolute control of his work).
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material, by specifying some activities as non-infringing.153 However, these specific
exemptions represent only a small fraction of the what the public is in fact entitled to do
with copyrighted material in the private sphere.154 As discussed earlier, the obsolescence
of the AHRA illustrates the difficulties of effectively addressing these issues before they
occur and the likelihood that existing solutions quickly become stale in the context of
fast-changing technology and consumer behavior.155 Clearly, the limitations that affect
option 3 apply with at least equal force to option 4, but the consequences may even
greater because of the different default rule.
In the majority of cases, instead of attempting to specify the circumstances in
which private uses would or would not constitute copyright infringement, Congress has
“taken the fifth” and left it to the courts to make that determination on a case-by- case
basisby applying the fair use doctrine .
Judges are of course entitled to question the wisdom of congressional delegation,
both in relation to private sphere copying and more generally. Nonetheless, until
Congress enacts more detailed policy, judges are stuck with making most of the hard
decisions. The question is, how should they make them?

153

For example, 17 USC 117 authorizes the owner of a copy of a computer program to make a copy or

adaptation of the program as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program, subject to certain
limitations. The same section also authorizes an archival copy.
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is required by the Copyright Act, for example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower.” Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975).
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As discussed in Part I, the four factors contained in the statutory elaboration of the
fair use doctrine should be seen as question-framing as opposed to outcomedeterminative. Congress has given the courts a framework for deciding fair use cases,
however it is still the responsibility of the courts to determine the scope of the copyright
owner’s rights in particular situations. This explains one half of the structural role of fair
use, that it is a standard that shifts policy making responsibility from the legislature to the
judiciary.
Structurally, the flexible and dynamic nature of fair use renders it both the
counter-weight to, and the enabler of, the equally flexible and dynamic exclusive rights
of copyright owners. The structural role of fair use allows the judiciary to adapt copyright
law in response to new technologies or other external forces. This is especially significant
given the broad expression of copyright owners’ exclusive rights in the 1976 Act, and the
increased breadth and duration of copyright protection brought about by the abandonment
of formalities such as copyright registration, notice and renewal.
One of the more interesting implications of the structural role of fair use is that
fair use actually benefits copyright owners as a class by facilitating a more expansive
definitions of their rights. This suggests that judges should disregard theories that view
fair use as merely a tax on copyright owners, or an ad hoc redistribution of entitlements.
It also suggests that judges need to carefully consider the allocation of the burden of
proof in where the defendant raises fair use as a defense to copyright infringement. The
jurisprudential implications of the structural role of fair use are considered in the next
section.
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Part IV – Jurisprudential Implications
Judges can not avoid making copyright policyin fair use cases . As discussed in
the preceding sections, the indeterminacy of the statutory fair use factors, and the
reluctance (or inability) of the legislature to enact specific rules in response technological
and social changes affecting copyright, necessitates that judges fill in the substantial gaps
in copyright law.
How should judges make sense of the jumble of case law and theory of the last
200 years? The preceding structural analysis of fair use suggests that Congress has
decided that the indeterminacy of a flexible fair use standard is preferable to the potential
rigidity of anything more specific. The Supreme Court has also stressed the benefits of
flexibility in its admonition to avoid the application of bright-line rules in fair use.156
Given this indeterminacy, how can judges decide fair use cases in a principled and nonarbitrary way?
A comprehensive survey of the literatureaddressing this question is beyond the
scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is possible to parse the majority of the literature into
three different schools of thought: thecost -benefit analysis school; the external normative
framework school; and the internal normative framework school. The meaning of these
labels will become apparent shortly.
A.

Existing Approaches to Determining Fair Use

The essence of a cost-benefit analysis approach to fair use is a comparison of the
costs versus the benefits of allowing the unauthorized use to continue. However, this
simple statement belies the complexity and diversity of opinions as to exactly how such a
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Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)
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test might be implemented. Wendy Gordon, for example, proposes that a finding of fair
use should be conditioned on the presence of market failure and a cost-benefit analysis
that indicates a net gain in social value in allowing the unauthorized use to continue.157 In
contrast to Gordon, Glynn Lunney proposes a pure form of cost-benefit analysis without
the filter of market failure. 158 Elsewhere I have undertaken a detailed examination of
competing law and economics analyses of fair use,159 a few preliminary observations are
worth making. First, viewing fair use as market failure necessarily characterizes fair use
as an exception the norm of unbounded copyright rights. As has been shown, fair use
plays a fundamental role in both bounding and thereby enabling expansive copyright
rights, fair use is more than an ad hoc exception to market failure. Second, cost-benefit
analysis asks judges to undertake a difficult and speculative factual enquiry. In that
context, allocation of burden of proof is likely to be more outcome-determinative than the
actual costs and benefits themselves. Third, even if a case by case cost-benefit analysis
were feasible, its administrative costs may well overshadow any gains in allocative
efficiency that it achieves. Consequently, cost-benefit analysis, with or without a
157

Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax

Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982). Gordon initially proposed a further
requirement that “an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff
copyright owner.” However, Gordon herself has subsequently retreated from that very limiting proposition,
see Gordon, The “Market Failure” And Intellectual Property: A Response To Professor Lunney, 82 B.U.L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (2002). Gordon also stresses that market failure is not confined to transactions costs (as
many have assumed) but incorporates, informational asymmetries, endowment effects and negative
externalities as well. Gordon, Market Failure, Id.
158

Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002).
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Matthew Sag, The Law And Economics Of Fair Use (2005) (working paper, on file with author).
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prerequisite of market failure, provides little guidance to judges as to how to actually
decide fair use cases.
In contrast to the exacting methodology of the cost-benefit approach, a number of
judges and scholars have suggested that fair use decisions should be made primarily with
recourse to normative conceptions of “the good.”160 Perhaps the most well known
proponent of this analysis is William Fisher. Fisherpropos es reconstructing the fair use
doctrine to “advance a substantive conception of a just and attractive intellectual culture”
– a vision of “the good life and the sort of society that would facilitate its widespread
realization.”161 To achieve this goal, Fisher extrapolates a set of preferences from various
schools of political philosophy.162 While Fisher’s proposal is thoughtfully developed, it
nonetheless amounts to little more than a collection of thinly substantiated preferences, 163
reflecting one man’s vision of the good life.164
Whether viewed as a subsidy or an entitlement, resorting to normative orderings
as a guide for implementing fair use is problematic for at least three reasons. First and
most obvious is the difficulty of locating an objective basis for any particular ordering.
Second, reliance on preference orderings could easily generate perverse results. For
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See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984). (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting); Merges, supra note 127, at 132-35 (advocates express recognition of fair use as both a tax on
copyright owners and a subsidy in favor of certain classes of users)
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William W. Fisher, Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1744 (1988).
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Id. at 1745-1762.
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Fisher’s preference for symphonies over television being one example. Id. at 1768.
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See Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1305 (“To concede that the vision is utopian is not enough, for

the vision that Professor Fisher presented is only one utopian vision among a great many.”)
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example, allowing a generous scope for fair use in a particular market, such as education
materials, might reduce incentives for production in that very market. Third, applying fair
use based on preference orderings as opposed to conduct is not a close fit with the
objectives of copyright, expressed in the Constitution as the encouragement of the
progress of science and the useful arts, not the progress of scientists and useful artists.
Commentators such as Lloyd Weinreb and Michael Madison advocate a variation
of basising fair use decisions on orderings of social preferences.165 They argue that fair
use should concentrate on accepted norms and customary practice as the basis for
determining the scope of the copyright owner’s legitimate interests. Relying on the
wisdom of the past assumes that those norms and practices were appropriate to begin
with and are applicable now, both of which may be incorrect. Furthermore, as technology
and society continue to change, it will always be contested whose accepted norms should
be applied or which customary practice is most applicable.
For example, file-sharers argue that their activities are consistent with an ethic of
sharing and past practices, such as recording and sharing mixed tapes. They equate filesharing with norms of individual autonomy which thrive on the internet, such as selfexpression, and creative collaboration.166 The recording industry argues that there is no
precedent for consumers making perfect substitutes for the industry’s products, and that

165

Lloyd L. Weinreb Fair’s Fair: A Comment On The Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990),

(fairness as compliance with accepted norms and customary practice); Michael Madison, A PatternOriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1525. (2004) (calling for more explicit
acknowledgment of the role of “favored practices” and “accepted patterns” in fair use analysis).
166

Netanel, supra note 147, at 2.
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legitimate sharing has never allowed wholesale copying.167 Opponents of file-sharing
equate it with theft and argue that it threatens the livelihoods of authors, artists, and a
multi-billion-dollar-a-year industry. Both sides in this debate rely on the virtue of
preexisting, but inconsistent, norms and practices; this illustrates that reliance on existing
norms and practices provides little guidance to judges in deciding fair use conflicts.
The third approach to answering this question looks at the fundamental principles
underlying copyright law itself. Looking to copyright itself for the assumptions necessary
to form fair use analysis is preferable to an unbounded normative inquiry precisely
because it is limited. In spite of its non-statutory nature, transformative use has quickly
become the dominant factor in fair use analysis.168 The Supreme Court derived the
transformative use test from its understanding of the purpose of copyright law itself. As
the Court explained, the goal of copyright is the promotion of science and the arts, and
that in turn requires some freedom for present authors to build on the works of the past.
[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use
much which was well known and used before.169
From this foundation the Court concluded that transformative works – any work which
“adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
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Id.
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Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Expanding The Transformative Use Test For Fair Use, 80 B.U.L.

REV. 579, 597 (2000).
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Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies,

8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845)).
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new expression, meaning, or message” to the original – deserve special recognition in fair
use.170
This paper has proposed a structural understanding of fair use as the mechanism
through which Congress has transferred a significant policy making to the judiciary.
Judges should recognize fair use decisions as a policy making exercise; however, they
should also be cognizant of the appropriate limits of policy making in that context.
Specifically, judges should work within the framework that Congress has given them, and
that framework is the law of copyright.
Transformative uses are given preference under the theory that encouraging the
production of new works that embrace and extend existing works benefits society. The
unstated assumption here is either that transformative uses are inherently good or that
transformative uses are more likely than non-transformative uses to be welfare
enhancing. Both of these assumptions are consistent with the Constitutional mandate for
copyright, which is the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts, as opposed
to the promotion of public welfare in general.171 Although the preamble does not create a
substantive limitation on congressional power,172 it nonetheless informs our
understanding of what copyright is and how the copyright system is supposed to function.
Until now, this approach has been confined to the concept of transformativeness.
But it follows from this article’s structural analysis that the third approach can be
170

Id. at 579.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003). Nimmer observes that “In fact, the introductory

phrase, rather than constituting a limitation on congressional authority, has for the most part tended to
expand such authority.” 1-1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03.
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expanded to incorporate other principles from copyright law. Although these principles
are also normative, they have greater legitimacy as they are based in doctrinal principles,
not just individual preferences. Additionally, these doctrinal norms are at least loosely
based on congressional preferences since they are drawn from copyright law and its
constitutional mandate.
B.

A New Approach: Applying Copyright Principles to Animate Fair Use

Judge Pierre Leval has urged courts to make transformative use the predominant
factor in their analysis and to “resist the impulse to import extraneous policies.”
Nonetheless, the limitations of transformativeness suggests that other factors must also be
considered. Limiting judicial discretion to principles inherent within copyright itself
makes sense, but transformative use is not the only animating principle from within
copyright law that judges should look to.
Transformative use is far from the end of the fair use inquiry. There are a number
of uses that do not appear to be transformative, but are nonetheless fair use. For example,
transformative use does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the fair use status of
untransformative reproduction of materials for use in the classroom provided for in
Section 107 itself.173 Nor can it explain the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sony that
noncommercial time-shifting of broadcast television is fair use. Transformative use also
fails to provide a convincing explanation of the fair use status of reverse engineering of
computer software, discussed in detail below.
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17 USC 107. (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A the fair use of a copyrighted

work, … for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”)
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In addition to these omissions, transformative use also has an ambiguous
relationship with derivative works. As Jeremy Kudon has observed, the definition of
derivative work appears to entirely overlap with the concept of transformative use.174
Distinguishing between infringing derivative works and transformative works requires
some concept of what the appropriate boundaries of the copyright owner’s derivative
rights should be. Transformativeness appears to be a conclusion rather than a test.
Finally, because transformativeness typically applies to critical works such as parody or
review, a number of scholars have expressed concern that transformativeness has made
some kind of critical element a necessary prerequisite for fair use.175
These criticisms do not imply that transformativeness is an inappropriate guiding
principle; rather they show that it can not be the only guiding principle elaborating the
meaning and application of fair use. Other fundamental principles of copyright have a
role to play in fleshing out fair use, once fair use’s structural role is understood. Three
key principles from copyright that may also play an animating role in fair use are: the
idea expression distinction, consumer autonomy and medium neutrality.
1.

The Idea Expression Distinction

Copyright is celebrated as the “engine of free expression” because of the
incentives it establishes for the creation and dissemination of information.176 However,
the efficiency of that engine depends on the effectiveness of the idea expression
174

Kudon, supra 168, at 592. A problem acknowledged but unresolved in Lavel’s original formulation, see

Leval, supra note 29, at 1111-1112.
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Bunker, supra note 111, at 17.
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Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Eldred v. Ashcroft,

537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
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distinction. As the Supreme Court explained in Harper & Row, the idea expression
distinction “strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression.”177 Where particular situations and advances in technology threaten
to undermine the idea expression distinction, courts have applied fair use to reinforce this
copyright principle.
Cases addressing the reverse engineering of computer software illustrate the
importance of applying fair use to preserve the idea expression distinction. Computer
programs are written in source code, a human readable language, but they are typically
distributed in object code which is only readable by computers.178 The object code
distributed on a compact discs or in the memory of a video game consoles is protected by
copyright,179 and yet the same object code also contains ideas and performs functions that
are not entitled to copyright protection.180 Unlike other copyright protected works, the
unprotectable elements of computer programs distributed in object code are hidden from
view. With the right tools, experienced programmers can extract the unprotectable
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Id. at 556.
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Source code is translated into a set of instructions for a particular type of machine through a process

known as compilation. The resulting object code consists literally of a long sequence of ones and zeros that
is then capable of running on a machine; to say that object code is ‘read’ by the machine does not imply
that it is comprehended. For a more detailed discussion see, Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ron S. Laurie,
Source Code Versus Object Code, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.235.
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Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir., 2000).
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elements from object code, however these methods almost invariably require making an
unauthorized copy, or multiple unauthorized copies, of the program.
Federal courts have consistently held that making unauthorized copies of a
computer program as a necessary step in reverse engineering is fair use.181 The Ninth
Circuit reverse engineering case of Sony v. Connectix,182 illustrates the centrality of
preserving the idea expression distinction and promoting legitimate competition. From
the beginning of its decision, the court emphasized the importance of the idea expression
distinction:
[W]e are called upon once again to apply the principles of copyright law to
computers and their software, to determine what must be protected as expression
and what must be made accessible to the public as function.183
Consistent with its decision in Sega,184 the court held that intermediate copying of
software could be protected as fair use if the copying was necessary to gain access to the
functional elements of the software.185 The court based its ruling firmly in the importance
of maintaining the idea expression distinction.
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E.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
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We drew this distinction because the Copyright Act protects expression only, not
ideas or the functional aspects of a software program. … Thus, the fair use
doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in
copyrighted computer software programs.186
The Ninth Circuit decided that the first fair use factor, the nature and purpose of the use,
favored the defendant in this case because it deemed reverse engineering to be legitimate
purpose, based on its understanding of the requirements of the idea expression
distinction.187 To comply with the perceived requirement that all fair uses must be
transformative, the court unconvincingly asserted that the defendant’s product was
“modestly transformative,”188 a conclusion based solely on characteristics of the
defendant’s non-infringing end product rather than its intermediate copying. The court
was distorting the concept of transformativeness because it clearly considered that fair
use should apply to reverse engineering. If the court had recognized that other principles
of copyright can guide the application of fair use, not just transformativeness, these
judicial acrobatics would have been unnecessary. The importance of the idea expression
distinction alone should have been enough to include reverse engineering within the
contours of fair use.
The Ninth Circuit’s understanding of the idea expression distinction was also
central to its determination of the market effect of Connectix’s reverse engineering, the
fourth fair use factor. The fourth factor requires courts to look beyond the mere presence
of an effect on the market or potential market of the copyright owner and ask whether the
market so effected is one which copyright protects. In Campbell, the Supreme Court quite
186

Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir., 2000).
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plainly differentiated the copyright owner’s general economic interests from the limited
protection afforded by copyright.189 Copyright neither protects the copyright owner from
parody, nor recognizes a protectable derivative market for criticism in general.190 Just as
Campbell recognizes that criticism is outside of the copyright owner’s protectable sphere
of interest, the reverse engineering cases recognize that the copyright owner has no
protectable interest in preventing the copying of unprotectable expression and ideas
buried within its object code. In Sony v Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that although
the defendant’s Virtual Game Station console directly competed with Sony in the market
for gaming platforms compatible with Sony games, the Virtual Game Station was a
“legitimate competitor” in that market.191 The court concluded that Sony’s desire to
control the market for gaming platforms was “understandable” but that “copyright law …
does not confer such a monopoly.”192 Principles such as the idea expression distinction
inform the a priori assumptions that courts must make before they can apply the fair use
doctrine in general or the four statutory factors in particular.
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2.

Consumer Autonomy

Justifying fair use in terms of critical transformative appropriation, or the
necessity of maintaining the idea expression distinction, may address the majority of fair
use decisions that courts are called on to make. But they do not bring us any closer to
rationalizing the fair use status of uncritical appropriation, such as consumer time shifting
which was the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony. This subsection
speculates that in addition to transformativeness and preserving the idea expression
distinction, there is a third guiding principle that can be read into copyright – consumer
autonomy.
Copyright’s first sale doctrine and significant cases in other areas, such as Sony,
appear to hinge upon an underlying notion of consumer autonomy. This principle has not
been explicitly articulated in the cases, but it is both a normatively appealing concept and
it provides a principled explanation for a range of developments. If consumer autonomy
does come to be recognized by the courts, it too should be a copyright principle used to
elucidate fair use.
To the extent that a principle of consumer autonomy exists, it is based on a
combination of the first sale doctrine and the omission of “use” from the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner. Under the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner’s exclusive
right to distribute a work is limited to its first sale, and the owner of a copy of a work is
entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy without permission from the copyright
owner, so long as the copy was lawfully made in the first place.193 The copyright owner
has the sole right to make copies and sell them, but for each copy sold, the owner’s right

193

17 USC 109(a), but note the exclusions in 109(b).
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to control distribution of any particular copy is exhausted by the first sale of that copy.
According to the Supreme Court,
[t]he whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places
a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his
exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.194
It has been suggested that the first sale doctrine has been weakened by
technological changes, especially in the realm of computer software.195 Several courts
have now accepted the proposition that the transfer of data from a permanent storage
device to a computer’s random access memory (“RAM”) constitutes a “copying” for
purposes of copyright law.196 However, Section 117 of the Copyright Act limits the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner with respect to computer programs. That section
provides that the owner of a copy of a program is entitled to load a copy of that program
to the computer’s RAM if that is “an essential step in the utilization of the computer
program in conjunction with a machine.”197 How far the RAM copying doctrine really
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Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
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For a nuanced discussion of the impact of technology on the first sale doctrine, see R. Anthony Reese,
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others. See Anthony Reece, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution To The
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extends the right of copyright owners to effectively control the “use” of their software
depends on the proper interpretation the Section 117 exemption.198
The first sale doctrine combined with the absence of any “use” right in copyright
allow a strong degree of autonomy for consumers; copyright owners are generally unable
to control the use (as opposed to copying) of their works by the public. For example, the
seller of a remotely activated garage door (operated by embedded software) has no right
to control how many times it is opened or which brand of garage door opener is used to
open it.199 Similarly, the publisher of a magazine presumably has no right to control the
order in which individual copies are read by consumers.
In the Galoob case,200 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Game Genie, a device
that enhanced the operation of the Nintendo gaming platform (by allowing players to
move differently and have more lives), did not infringe Nintendo’s copyright because it
neither copied Nintendo’s games nor made derivative works of them.201 The court
declined to stretch the definition of derivative work to include altering the way a video
game was played, for fear of chilling innovation in computer applications.202 The court
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See generally, 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.08. The critical questions in this regard are: (1) what rights

do consumers have to use third party parts and services in combination with copyrighted digital content; (2)
what rights do consumers have to modify or upgrade copyrighted digital content; and (3) to what extent can
copyright owners can bind consumers to contractual restrictions that conflict with their rights under the first
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concluded that a program or device that improves the performance of a copyrighted
program without copying it does not create a derivative work of the initial program, even
if it changes the way the initial program is perceived or displayed.203
These cases and the first sale doctrine itself rest on the logic of a principle of
consumer autonomy. But, the question remains: is there a freestanding principle of
consumer autonomy that can inform fair use analysis, assuming that one or more of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights appear to have been infringed? Sony sheds some light
on this question.
In Sony, the majority explained that although consumers who engaged in timeshifting of broadcast television copied the entire program – a factor that usually weighs
heavily against fair use – the extent of their copying did not have its ordinary effect
because “time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been
invited to witness in its entirety free of charge.”204 In other words: once a copyrighted
work is lawfully placed into the hands of a consumer, the consumer is free to consume
the product as she chooses, regardless of whether the copyright owner would prefer that
she consume in some other fashion.
The same logic was applied in Galoob, where the Ninth Circuit held that even if
the Game Genie created a derivative work (they held it did not), consumers were
nonetheless entitled to use the Game Genie in conjunction with games they had lawfully
acquired.205 In both Sony and Galoob, the courts held that copyright owner’s exclusive
203

Id.
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rights did not reach so far as to control the precise manner in which consumers used their
works, provided that consumers paid the going price.
A principle of consumer autonomy is also evident in Recording Industry
Association of America’s (“RIAA”) ill-fated challenge to portable MP3 players.206 The
RIAA sought to enjoin the manufacture and distribution of Diamond Rio’s MP3 player,
alleging that it did not meet the requirements for digital audio recording devices under the
AHRA.207 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the court held thatthe AHRA did not
apply to either a computer hard-drive, or a device that merely received files from a
computer hard-drive.208 In passing, the court commented on the purpose of the AHRA,
which it viewed as “the facilitation of personal use.”209 The court adopted the words of
the House report, explaining that the AHRA’s home taping exemption, “protects all
noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and analog musical recordings.”210
Echoing Sony, the court analogized transferring music from a CD to a portable MP3
player to recording broadcast television for the purpose of time-shifting.
fact that the derivative works created by the Game Genie are comprised almost entirely of Nintendo’s
copyrighted displays does not militate against a finding of fair use.)
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Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir., 1999).
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17 U.S.C.S. § 1002(a)(1), (2) (Digital audio recording device required to conform to the Serial Copy

Management System); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir., 1999)
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Id. at 1078 - 1079.
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Id. at 1079; See also Senate report, “the purpose of [the Act] is to ensure the right of consumers to make

analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.” S. Rep. 102294, at *86.
210

17 USC § 1008, see H.R. REP. 102-873(I), at *59.
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The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or “space-shift,” those
files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. Such copying is paradigmatic
noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.211
The idea of consumer autonomy as a guiding principle for fair use can, of course, be
taken too far. There is an important distinction to made between consumer autonomy for
consumers acting as consumers as opposed to consumers acting as potential rivals of the
copyright owner. In Napster, the district court held that the copying which the filesharing service facilitated did not qualify as “personal use in the traditional sense.”212 The
district court saw “critical differences” between Napster’s try-then-buy argument213 and
the use of VCRs for time-shifting. An individual Napster user “who downloads a copy of
a song to her hard drive may make that song available to millions of other individuals,
even if she eventually chooses to purchase the CD,”214 whereas time-shifting broadcast
television or space-shifting music to a portable device does not distribute the copyrighted
work beyond the intended user. On appeal the Ninth Circuit similarly distinguished the
“shifting” analyses of Sony and Diamond because of the difference between personal use
and distribution of the work. 215 So, clearly multiple courts are at least implicitly adopting
an underlying concept of consumer autonomy.

211

Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir., 1999)

(citation & quote omitted).
212

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (D. Cal., 2000).

213

Napster argued that unauthorized file-sharing did not have an adverse market effect on copyright owners

because file-sharers might become consumers after sampling music on-line.
214

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (D. Cal., 2000).

215

A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir., 2001). (“Both Diamond and Sony are

inapposite because the methods of shifting in these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of
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Copyright law allows some forms of price discrimination, such as temporal
market segmentation and versioning. For example, high priced hardcover books are
released earlier than cheaper paperbacks and are also more durable. Yet copyright and
other laws generally limit the content owner’s control of her products once released into
the stream of commerce,216 so there is clearly no absolute right to price discriminate. At
any rate, before they can fully embrace the notion of consumer autonomy, courts should
consider whether the copyright owner has an interest in price discrimination that
outweighs considerations of consumer autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some support for
the notion of consumer autonomy as a fundamental principle of copyright; indeed it is
difficult to explain the evidentiary presumptions applied in Sony on any other theory.
3.

Medium Neutrality

Finally, in addition to copyright’s preference for transformative uses, maintaining
the idea expression distinction and (possibly) preserving consumer autonomy, fair use
analysis should also recognize the importance of medium neutrality. Medium neutrality is
the principle that a use should not receive less protection, simply by virtue of being
expressed in a different medium.
Medium neutrality is not a principle inherent to copyright in the same wayas
those listed above; however, it provides a useful reality check against importing
the copyrighted material to the general public; the time or space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed
the material only to the original user.”)
216

For example, antitrust law prohibits resale price maintenance. For a more detailed discussion of the

uncertain case for price discrimination in the context of intellectual property see James Boyle, Cruel, Mean,
or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2007 (2000).
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unwarranted assumptions as to the illegitimacy of non-mainstream points of view and
non-mainstream vehicles of expression. There is no reason to reject the unequal treatment
of different media of expression out of hand, but unless Congress has indicated a
preference for or against a particular medium, courts should at least be suspicious of
analysis that leads to unequal treatment.
Again, the reverse engineering cases provide support for the idea of medium
neutrality in the sense of preserving the idea expression distinction in computer software.
The abstract idea of a storyline is not protected by copyright, even though it is contained
in the text of a protected novel; nor are facts, dates and historical events, even if they are
contained in a protected history book. Medium neutrality dictates that uncopyrightable
programming structures and APIs should not receive special protection by virtue of being
released in object code which makes them unreadable to humans. Consistent with the
principle of medium neutrality, courts allow reverse engineering of object code to
discover these unprotectable elements.
Computer software is not exceptional in this regard; even within more conventional
media, there is a strong case for a presumption of neutrality. For example, a recent
Eleventh Circuit decision, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,217 indicates that courts
attempt to accord equal treatment and respect to all forms of criticism, even if some
necessitate more copying than others. In that case, the court ruled that Alice Randall’s
retelling of “Gone With The Wind” (“GWTW”) from the perspective of Scarlet’s
African-American half-sister was clearly a criticism and a parody of the original. Using

217

268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir., 2001).
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this literary device as the vehicle for her rejoinder to the perceived racism of GWTW218
required Randall to appropriate much more of the original than would have been required
for other methods, such as a literary essay.
In a very strong statement suggesting the importance of medium neutrality, the
Eleventh Circuit held:
The fact that Randall chose to convey her criticisms of GWTW through a work of
fiction, which she contends is a more powerful vehicle for her message than a
scholarly article, does not, in and of itself, deprive TWDG of fair-use
protection.219
The court held that even though Randall had made extensive use of characters, plot points
and settings in GWTW, her work was capable of fair use protection because the extent of
that borrowing was required by the critical genre she had chosen.220 What separates
Randall’s work from mere fan fiction is its critical element – the court was convinced that
Randall’s book was “principally and purposefully a critical statement.” 221 Based on that
conviction it was willing to allow Randall enough freedom to achieve her critical purpose

218

Id. at 1269-1270. (“In the world of GWTW, the white characters comprise a noble aristocracy whose

idyllic existence is upset only by the intrusion of Yankee soldiers, and, eventually, by the liberation of the
black slaves. Through her characters as well as through direct narration, Mitchell describes how both blacks
and whites were purportedly better off in the days of slavery: "The more I see of emancipation the more
criminal I think it is. It’s just ruined the darkies," says Scarlett O’Hara. Free blacks are described as
"creatures of small intelligence . . . like monkeys or small children turned loose among treasured objects
whose value is beyond their comprehension, they ran wild - either from perverse pleasure in destruction or
simply because of their ignorance.”) (citations omitted).
219

Id. at 1269.

220

Id. at 1267.

221

Id. at 1270.
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in her chosen medium. This lends support to the argument that medium neutrality is an
important copyright principle, and so should be incorporated into fair use analysis.
C.

Assessment

Fair use would be much more certain and much easier to administer if Congress
had formulated policy more completely and given courts a set of bright-line rules to
follow. Instead, Congress has relieved itself of the burden of difficult decisions and left
the judiciary to apply a vague and open ended standard. The merits of this choice are
debatable, but the consequences for judges in fair use cases seem clear – they have no
choice but to engage in policy making.
In this paper I have suggested that in order to make policy in relation to fair use,
judges should restrict themselves to one toolkit – principles derived from copyright law.
This approach lacks the lure of simple and immediate answers offered by a cost-benefit
analysis, but it is a far more realistic exercise to expect judges to undertake, given the
limits of judicial resources and the speculative nature of any case-by- case empirical
inquiry. The approach suggested here must also be contrasted against that of encouraging
courts to justify their assumptions in terms of an unlimited normative inquiry, or the
closely related proposition of accepted norms and customary practice. Confining a
judge’s search for grounding assumptions to principles she can justify in terms of
copyright law itself is still a normative exercise, but it is a sharply more limited one.
These limits are important because they will, over time, lead to the development of a
more stable and predictable fair use jurisprudence.

79

Working Paper, March 2005 Draft

Conclusion
Deus ex machina, literally “god from the machine,” refers to the resolution of an
apparently insoluble crisis through divine intervention. In ancient Greek dramas, an
intervening god was often brought on stage by an elaborate piece of equipment; thus the
expression, god from the machine. Fair use is the god in the copyright machine. Unlike
the Greek gods, who were unconstrained by reality, fair use does not dissolve the inherent
conflict arising from opposing interests, but it is the mechanism for their resolution.
Law and technology interact with consequences that are fundamentally
unpredictable. What is predictable is that copyright law will need to be continually
adapted to the demands of changing circumstances. Fair use plays a vital role in the
copyright system by facilitating change. The flexibility of both the rights of copyright
owners, and the fair use that can be made of copyrighted works, stems from Congress’
delegation of policy making responsibility to the judiciary. Fair use is the structure
through which the conflict between the need for certainty and adaptability can be
resolved.
Fair use has a curious and misunderstood relationship with the rights of copyright
owners. Many emphasize fair use’s role in limiting those rights. However, the fair use
doctrine has also enabled the expansion of copyright rights, precisely because it
establishes a flexible boundary on those rights. Historically, and in a contemporary
setting, fair use has benefited copyright owners by facilitating a more expansive and
dynamic definition of their rights than would be otherwise possible.
Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of copyright expansion are bound to
be disappointed. Congress has seen fit to radically expand the application, duration and
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scope of rights associated with copyright; there is little point wishing the courts would
apply the fair use doctrine in order to derail this agenda. Nonetheless, fair use remains an
important counter-weight to the broad rights of copyright owners. Properly applied, fair
use ensures significant freedom for criticism, commentary, reference, innovation and
experimentation. Congress has delegated substantial policy making discretion to judges
so that they can apply fair use in this fashion, as changing circumstances require. Thus
fair use is actually working as intended: fair use is not a failed protector of the status quo,
but rather it is a successful agent of change.
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